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Abstract 
 
We explore the sharp uptrend in recent trading activity and accompanying changes in market 
efficiency.  Higher turnover has been associated with more frequent smaller trades, which have 
progressively formed a larger fraction of trading volume over time.  Evidence indicates that 
secular decreases in trading costs have influenced the turnover trend.  Turnover has increased the 
most for stocks with the greatest level of institutional holdings, suggesting professional investing 
as a key contributor to the turnover trend.  Variance ratio tests suggest that more institutional 
trading has increased information-based trading.  Intraday volatility has decreased and prices 
conform more closely to random walk in recent years.  The sensitivity of turnover to past returns 
has increased and cross-sectional predictability of returns has decreased significantly, revealing a 
more widespread use of quantitative trading strategies that allow for more efficient securities 
prices.   
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 I. Introduction 
 
Intense trading activity is a conspicuous aspect of financial markets.  For example, the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) website reports that the share turnover rate on the NYSE in 2008 is 
well in excess of 100%, corresponding to a volume in excess of 800 billion shares.  The 
investing public paid several billion dollars for these transactions.  In his AFA presidential 
address, French (2008) suggests that the cost of price discovery via trading was about $99 billion 
in 2006.1 
 
Trading activity in equities is not only at high levels, but also has increased dramatically 
over the past few years.2  The value-weighted average monthly share turnover (on the NYSE) 
increased from about 5% to about 26% from the beginning of 1993 to the end of 2008, and the 
average daily number of transactions increased about ninety-fold during that same period.3  The 
aim of this paper is to empirically explore this strong upswing and accompanying changes in 
market efficiency.  Although examining an unusual pattern in trading and accompanying shifts in 
market efficiency measures are worthwhile pursuits in themselves, our study attains further 
significance because recent research has found that increases in trading activity are associated 
with decreases in the cost of equity capital.4   
 
There have been previous time-series studies of volume, many of which have focused on 
the contemporaneous links between volume and other variables such as returns and volatility.  
For example, a number of empirical papers have documented a positive correlation between 
volume and absolute price changes (see Karpoff, 1987, Schwert, 1989, and Gallant, Rossi, and 
                                                     
1 French (2008) includes trading commissions as well as the fees charged by mutual funds and hedge funds in his 
cost measure, and documents that U.S. investors spent an average of 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market 
each year over the period 1980-2006 in searching for superior returns. 
2 Apart from the NYSE, a dramatic increase in trading volume is evident in a number of markets, including Nasdaq, 
the London Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, among others.  See World Federation of Exchanges 
(http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/equity-markets). 
3 In contrast to the trend from 1993 to 2008, turnover remained virtually unchanged at around 4.5% per month 
during the decade prior to 1993 (NYSE.com). 
4See Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, 
and Anshuman (2001). 
2 
 
 
 
Tauchen, 1992).  Other papers document calendar regularities in volume.  Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987, 1991) find that volume is higher at the market’s open, while Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993) demonstrate a U-shaped intraday volume pattern and also find that trading 
volume is lower on Mondays.  Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) observe that volume from 
institutions is smaller but individual investor volume is larger at the beginning of the week.  In 
another stream of research, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) and Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar, and Wang (2002) analyze the dynamic relation between returns and volume levels. 
  
This paper examines the trend in trading activity and the impact of this trend on market 
efficiency measures.  Trading costs have declined substantially and this decline has contributed 
significantly to the volume trends.  For example, French (2008) and Chakravarty, 
Panchapagesan, and Wood (2005) argue that institutional commissions have declined over time, 
and it is well known (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001) that bid-ask spreads have 
also decreased substantially.  Further, the advent of technology has made it easier for institutions 
to execute automated algorithmic trading (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2008) and online 
brokerage accounts have made trading easier for retail investors.  With lower trading costs, the 
demand for trading activity has gone up, and with the advent of technology, it has become easier 
for exchanges to accommodate large trading volumes.  
 
However, recognizing that trading frictions have decreased still leaves several 
unanswered research questions related to the turnover trend.  For example, which types of 
investors have responded most to decreased frictions?  One possibility is that on-line brokerages, 
lower trading costs, and the accompanying “illusion of control” (Barber and Odean, 2002) has 
intensified trading by retail investors.  Another possibility is that institutional trading (induced 
perhaps by reduced commissions and spreads) accounts for much of the turnover trend.5  A third 
possible factor is the advent of widespread algorithmic trading.  Other determinants of trading 
                                                     
5 Evidence indicates that assets in institutional as well as individual accounts have increased substantially over the 
sample period.  For example, both mutual fund assets and the number of retail accounts grew fourfold from 1996 to 
2001 (see Saxton, 2002, and Charting Success: An Overview of Online Brokerage and Emerging eTrends in the 
Securities Industry, 3 April 2001, JP Morgan).  This observation makes it particularly intriguing to examine whether 
institutional or retail investing is primarily responsible for the turnover increase. 
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activity, such as dispersion of opinion and implied volatility, might have increased and may have 
contributed to the trend.  These possible influences are not mutually exclusive.  
 
A related, and arguably more important, issue involves the economic consequences of the 
turnover trend.  If the trend is largely due to uninformed investing, then the market may have 
become more volatile and less efficient at incorporating information.  Alternatively, trading by 
more informed agents may well have led to greater information production and a more efficient 
market with reduced short-run fluctuations. 
 
Motivated by the above observations, we address the following questions: (i) What 
microstructure patterns have accompanied the sharp increase in turnover?  Is the increase due to 
changes in transaction frequency, or trade size, or both? (ii) Who, amongst institutions or 
individuals is primarily responsible for the turnover trend? (iii) Is it possible to discern why 
trading by certain trader classes has increased?  (iv) What have been the consequences of the 
shift in trading activity? Has information-based trading increased?  Has market quality increased 
or decreased?  Have there been changes in the cross-section of expected turnover and returns 
possibly due to the actions of hedge funds that trade on cross-sectional return predictability? 
 
We examine these issues in several stages.  First, we establish some basic empirical 
features of the recent turnover trend.  In particular, we show that volume has increased 
substantially for both S&P 500 constituent larger stocks and non-S&P 500 smaller stocks, 
suggesting that neither indexation nor market capitalization are responsible for the increase in 
trading activity.6  We also document that the turnover increase has principally resulted from 
smaller trades and a greater frequency of transactions.  We then ask whether institutions or 
individuals are primarily responsible for the increase in turnover.  We find that stocks with larger 
levels of institutional holdings experienced the greatest increases in turnover, indicating a 
possible causative role for institutions.  In addition, changes in the breadth of ownership (as 
                                                     
6 French (2008) shows that the fraction of US domestic equity invested passively has increased steadily for all four 
groups of institutions (defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, non-profits and public funds) examined.  
For instance, non-profits start with 2.8% of their assets passively managed in 1986, which increased to 28.7% in 
2006. 
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measured by the number of shareholders) are not associated with changes in turnover in the 
cross-section.  Under the supposition that changes in ownership breadth primarily reflect changes 
in dispersed retail ownership (as opposed to concentrated institutional ownership), this further 
points to the role of institutions in causing turnover trends.  Moreover, daily serial correlation in 
large trade imbalances have increased the most for stocks with the largest levels of institutional 
holdings.  Since large orders are more likely to be used by institutions, this finding once again 
suggests that it is institutional trading that has led to the recent increases in trading volume. 
 
While exogenous decreases in trading costs due to technological advances and declines in 
the tick size are well known and have undoubtedly influenced trading activity,7 have other 
known determinants changed in a manner consistent with increases in institutional trading?  We 
consider this question by looking at shifts in analysts’ forecast dispersion, equity fund flows, and 
option-implied volatility.  The evidence suggests that the shifts in these determinants during 
recent years are not nearly as dramatic as shifts in trading activity, and that these determinants 
play a very modest role in explaining the time-series variation in turnover.  This suggests that a 
secular increase in liquidity and improvements in trading technology are mainly responsible for 
the increase in trading.   
 
Finally, we turn to the link between increased trading by institutions and price formation.  
One possibility is that institutions are able to trade more effectively on private information in 
recent years, thereby contributing to increased market efficiency.  A second possibility is that 
they are able to more effectively trade on findings about cross-sectional return predictability.  
Evidence supports both of these conjectures.  Our analysis of open/close and close/open variance 
ratios (along the lines of French and Roll, 1986) indicates that increased turnover has indeed 
been accompanied by increased information-based trading, and this increase is most pronounced 
for stocks with the highest levels of institutional holdings.  Further, intraday volatility has 
decreased and hourly/daily variance ratios indicate that prices conform more closely to random 
                                                     
7 As Chakravarty, Panchagesan and Wood (2005) point out, the decline in trading commissions can be attributed to 
the growth of alternative, automated trading systems as well as online brokerage firms which allow institutions a 
greater choice of execution venues and, consequently, greater competition between providers of trading services. 
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walks in recent years, which indicates that increased trading activity has been accompanied by 
enhanced market quality.  Moreover, turnover has become more sensitive in recent years to 
return predictors that are increasingly employed in quantitative trading strategies used by hedge 
funds,8 pointing to the prominent role of these institutions in causing turnover patterns.  This 
pattern also has been accompanied by decreased cross-sectional return predictability.  Thus, 
overall, the most important conclusion from the analysis is that the increased trading activity has 
been accompanied by increased market quality. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data.  
Section III presents preliminary evidence on the increase in trading activity.  Section IV provides 
evidence that the increase in turnover is likely due to increased institutional trading.  Section V 
analyzes the association between greater institutional trading and price formation, while Section 
VI concludes.  
 
II. The Data 
 
 
The sample period 1993 to 2008 was chosen because the Trade and Quote (TAQ) data are 
available from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) beginning in 1993.  The sample consists 
of NYSE-listed stocks only.  This avoids aggregating volume across exchanges with different 
trading protocols. 9  
 
Stocks are included or excluded during a calendar year depending on the following criteria: 
• To be included, a stock has to be present at the beginning of the year in both the CRSP and 
the intraday (TAQ) databases.  
• If a firm changed exchanges during a year  it was excluded from the sample for that year.  
                                                     
8 Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002) discuss the hedge fund strategies based on empirical return predictors. 
9 During the early years of our sample, the dealer is always assumed to take the other side of every transaction on 
Nasdaq, as opposed to often acting as an intermediary (see Atkins and Dyl, 1997).  This leads to trades being 
“double counted” and artificially inflates volume on Nasdaq relative to that on NYSE.  However, the definition of 
Nasdaq volume has changed over time to include only customer-to-customer transactions (Anderson and Dyl, 2005).  
This change in interpretation of Nasdaq volume over time makes the dynamic analysis of Nasdaq volume, and its 
comparison to NYSE volume, problematic. 
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• Since their trading characteristics might differ from ordinary equities, assets in the following 
categories were also removed from the sample: certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial 
interest, units, companies incorporated outside the U.S., Americus Trust components, closed-
end funds, preferred stocks and REITs.  
• Any stock with price greater than $999 was deleted from the sample. 
 
Given that a stock is included in the sample, its transaction data are filtered for errors and the 
trades are signed as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001).  The Lee and Ready (1991) 
trade-signing algorithm is used to designate buy and sell trades, and calculate order imbalances 
for use later in the analysis.10   Note that due to the filtering, a number of trades (especially for 
large stocks with a large number of trades), are excluded because of out of sequence recording of 
trades or because the trades are recorded before the open or after the close.  Also, some trades 
cannot be signed as buy or sell trades and are excluded from the sample.11  Due to the exclusion 
of trades, the turnover obtained using transactions data from TAQ is understated compared to 
turnover obtained from CRSP.   
 
Two subperiods are selected to give an indication of changing conditions.  They each span 
eight complete calendar years; Subperiod 1 includes 1993 to 2000, and Subperiod 2 covers 2001 
to 2008.  Data pertaining to candidate determinants of turnover are described when used. 
 
III. Preliminary Evidence 
 
Figure 1 presents the value-weighted monthly turnover for NYSE stocks from 1993 through 
2008 inclusive.  The monthly turnover for each individual stock is obtained from CRSP trading 
volume and shares outstanding; then a value-weighted average is computed using market 
                                                     
10 The matching quote is the first quote at least five seconds prior to a trade for the period from 1993 to 1998.  Due 
to a generally accepted decline in reporting errors in recent times (see, for example, Madhavan et al., 2002), after 
1998, the matching quote is simply the first quote prior to the trade.   
11 We use the tick test going back five lags (and no more) if trades occur at the quote midpoint.  This results in some 
trades not being assigned a sign.  An exploratory analysis reveals the proportion of trades that cannot be signed to be 
fairly small; for example, in January 1993, 2002 and 2008, the proportions for IBM are 5.6%, 1.78%, and 1.13%, 
respectively. 
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capitalization at the end of the previous year.   To examine the possible role of indexation, we 
present separate plots for S&P500 and non-S&P500 NYSE stocks.12  This also indicates the 
effect of market capitalization, since stocks included in the S&P500 are generally larger firms.  
As can be seen, trading activity has increased markedly for both groups.  Turnover for either 
group starts from below 6% (per month) at the beginning of the period (January 1993) and 
exceeds 40% in 2008 before falling to around 25% in December 2008.   
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics associated with turnover for the two 
subperiods.13   There is no evidence that the turnover of index (large cap) stocks increased more 
or less than that of non-index (smaller cap) stocks.  Indeed, an unreported test shows that the 
average difference in turnover between non-index and index stocks throughout both subperiods 
is positive and significant.14  In Panel B of Table 1, we fit the turnover series to trend variables.  
Since Figure 1 demonstrates a clear non-linear trend, we include linear through quartic trend 
terms, represented by orthogonal Legendre polynomials.15  Confirming the evidence in Panel A, 
all the trend terms are positive and significant for both the S&P 500 and the non-S&P 500 
turnover series. The adjusted R2s exceed 80% in both cases. 
 
The increase in turnover could result from an increase in trading frequency or in the 
average trade size, or possibly both.  To shed some light on this issue, Panel A of Figure 2 plots 
the daily average dollar trade size (transaction sizes are first averaged for each stock on a daily 
basis, and then a value-weighted mean is calculated for each trading day).  After increasing from 
around $70,000 to $90,000 in the mid-1990s, the dollar trade size declined precipitously and is 
only around $7,000 in 2008.  Trades are now being conducted in ever-smaller units.  We also 
                                                     
12 The S&P 500 index is by far the most common benchmark for index funds (see, Fabozzi and Molay, 2000). 
13 The NYSE Fact Book documents that turnover in the early 1900s was also very high.  For instance, the highest 
annual turnover to date of 319% occurred in 1901.  Except for outliers such as 1929, the reported share volume has 
increased relatively steadily over time.  After 1962 the increase in share trading volume is quite slow but it has 
accelerated dramatically in more recent years (see also footnote 3).   
14 The various references to significance (at the 5% level unless otherwise noted) or lack thereof across the two 
subperiods in this paper are based on standard difference-in-means tests. 
15 In all of the trend regressions either reported in tables or mentioned in the text, the time index runs from –1 to +1 
and the Cochrane and Orcutt (1949) method adjusts for residual autocorrelation as necessary.  The results are 
qualitatively similar in every case without the correction for autocorrelation.   
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plot the average number of transactions per day in Panel B of Figure 2.  This quantity has 
increased considerably through the sample period.  Note that the vertical axis uses logs, which 
implies that the number of transactions has been increasing at an accelerating rate.   
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the average trade size and number of transactions 
by subperiod.  It indicates that the average trade size has decreased by about 56%, whereas the 
average number of transactions has increased more than ten-fold across the two subperiods.  
Consequently, the increase in total dollar turnover is entirely driven by an increase in trading 
frequency, which has more than offset the decline in average trade size. 
 
As an additional piece of evidence regarding the source of the increase in dollar turnover, 
Figure 3 documents the proportion of dollar volume in trades less than or more than $10,000.16  
For each stock and day, we simply add up the dollar volume of trades exceeding and falling 
below $10,000 then calculate the (value-weighted) average of these quantities across stocks.  
There is a clear pattern: the proportion of volume due to smaller (larger) trades has been growing 
(falling) at an accelerating pace.  Further, Table 2 indicates that the proportion of small trades 
increased more than four-fold in the second period relative to the first.  However, as Figure 3 
reveals, the second subperiod’s increase does not fully depict the dramatic acceleration in the 
fraction of small trades during the last few years. 
 
Table 2 also fits the number of transactions, trade size, and the percentage of trades under 
$10,000 to trend variables, as in Panel B of Table 1. As can be seen, all trend variables are 
positive and significant for both the number of transactions and the small trade percentage, 
confirming the non-linear upward trend for these quantities.   For transaction size, the linear and 
quadratic terms are negative and significant, but the cubic and quartic terms are positive and 
significant. It is easily verified, however, that the overall trend is strongly negative for trade size.   
                                                     
16 Lee (1992) uses a cutoff of $10,000 to separate large and small traders.  Barber and Odean (2000) report median 
trade sizes of about $5,000 for individual investors, with larger means (see also Kaniel, Saar and Titman, 2008).  As 
a robustness check, we also experiment with a cutoff of 10,000 shares to separate large and small trades, and the 
results are qualitatively the same. 
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The next section considers the behavior of liquidity and the relative importance of 
investor types for the turnover trend.  It also investigates whether known determinants of 
turnover have shifted recently in a manner consistent with the increase in turnover. 
 
IV. Potential Causes of Recent Trends in Trading Activity Patterns 
 
The analysis thus far indicates that the increase in turnover is due to ever-smaller trades 
conducted ever more frequently.   There are several possible reasons for this (which are not 
mutually exclusive).  First, illiquidity, as measured, for example, by effective spreads, may have 
shown a greater decline for smaller trades relative to larger ones due to exogenous shifts in ease 
of trading for small orders (e.g., by way of the NYSE Direct system).17  Second, direct retail 
investing, consisting predominantly of smaller trades, may have increased due to the advent of 
online trading technologies (Barber and Odean, 2002).  Third, institutions may have resorted to 
splitting orders to take advantage of lower trading costs in the presence of reduced depths as 
documented in Chakravarty, Panchapagesan and Wood (2005) as well as Jones and Lipson 
(2001).    Fourth, other potential determinants of trading activity such as dispersion of analyst 
opinions and mutual fund flows may have contributed to the turnover increase.  We now 
empirically explore these potential reasons for the turnover increase. 
 
A. Cost of Trading 
 
Do turnover trends mirror a pattern in liquidity?   Figure 4, Panel A reports the average 
proportional effective spreads for large trades (>$10,000) and small trades (≤$10,000) over time.  
These spreads are calculated by matching prevailing quotes to each transaction in our sample of 
NYSE stocks from 1993 to 2008. 18  As can be seen, spreads have generally been decreasing for 
both large and small trades, (except for their widening in the financial crisis towards the end of 
                                                     
17 The NYSE Direct system is a procedure introduced in 2000 for automated execution of small trades (less than 
1,099 shares).   For details, see Huang (2002). 
18 The effective spread is calculated as twice the absolute difference between the transaction price and the mid-point 
of the prevailing bid-ask quote for each matched transaction.  This quantity is then averaged during the trading day; 
then value-weighted across stocks.  
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the sample period).  Indeed, Panel A of Table 3 indicates that the average effective spread is 
about eight cents lower in 2001-2008 than in 1993-2000 for each type of trade, and an 
unreported test indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
cases.   Further, we have verified that both the spread series (for large and small trades) exhibit a 
strongly significant and negative linear trend, but the difference between large and small trade 
spreads does not exhibit a significant trend.  This indicates a secular increase in liquidity for 
reasons unrelated to the mix of trades.19   
 
Panel B of Figure 4 as well as Table 3 reports depth at the inside quote for the two 
subperiods.  Consistent with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), inside depth has 
decreased in the second subperiod.   The decrease in depth can be attributed to decreases in the 
minimum tick size, which has reduced the willingness of market makers to display large quote 
sizes at the inside price quotes.  Depth decreases at the inside quotes do not necessarily imply 
that the overall depth has decreased, because depth outside the minimum quotes may well have 
increased.  However, the data on overall depth are available only in the limit order book, which 
is not available over our extended sample period.   The decrease in depth likely has contributed 
to the shift to smaller transactions by market participants that is documented in Table 2.   Even as 
difference between the effective spreads for large and small transactions has not diverged much, 
the reduced depth has it made it less cost-effective to execute large transaction sizes. 
 
Based on the evidence in Table 3, it is tempting to attribute the overall trend in trading 
activity to spread decreases.  But, the endogeneity between spreads and trading activity is not 
completely addressed by Table 3. This endogeneity arises because it is not clear whether the 
decrease in spreads has led to the increase in trading or whether the increase in trading volume 
has led to a decrease in spreads.  Note, however, that spreads have decreased both for large and 
small orders even though the increase in volume is largely due to an increase in small orders, 
                                                     
19 In addition to secular spread declines, trading commissions also have decreased steadily over the years.  Indeed, 
French (2008) documents the dramatic reductions in trading commissions relative to trading volume from over 60 
basis points in 1993 to 11 basis points in 2006.  Also, given the significant decreases in computing costs, online 
trading has become far easier.  Thus, there has been a general decrease in trading costs over and beyond liquidity 
decreases. 
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suggesting a secular trend in spreads over time.  Nevertheless, in an attempt to further address 
this endogeneity problem, we consider the natural experiment afforded by the tick size 
reductions.  The eighth to sixteenth shift on the NYSE occurred on June 24, 1997 and the 
sixteenth to decimals shift on January 29, 2001.  These exogenous tick size shifts are 
accompanied by immediate and dramatic drops in bid-ask spreads (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2001).     
 
To examine the effect of the tick size shift on trading activity, we run cross-sectional 
regressions of changes in average turnover between one month prior and one month after the 
change in the tick size as a function of the change in the average relative quoted spread (quoted 
spread divided by the quote midpoint)20 and the change in daily volatility (i.e., the change in the 
daily standard deviation of returns) across the same period.  The inclusion of the latter control 
variable is based on the evidence in Karpoff (1987) and Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam 
(2007) that volatility bears an important relation with volume.  Results from the regression 
appear in Table 4.  The table shows that the coefficient on spreads is negative and significant 
around both exogenous tick size decreases even after accounting for the effect of volatility.  In 
economic terms, a one standard deviation decline in relative spreads due to the tick size change 
from 1/8 to 1/16 results in a 0.033% increase in turnover and a one standard deviation decrease 
in relative spreads due to decimalization results in a 0.036% increase in turnover.  The results 
accord with the notion that a decline in the cost of a product (trading activity) leads to an 
increase in its consumption.21  In the next subsection, we try to ascertain the influences of 
individual and institutional investing on share turnover. 
 
B. Retail vs. Institutional Trading 
 
                                                     
20 We present results with the quoted (rather than effective) spread because traders respond to the posted quotes, 
while the effective spread is established after trades have been executed. In any case, results are essentially 
unchanged if the effective spread is used. 
21 Note that in general trading volumes are high in markets with lower trading costs.  For instance, volume in the 
foreign exchange market is over $3 trillion per day with small bid-ask spreads.  Thus, a typical quote in the Dollar-
Euro market may be 1.2960-1.2965 with a typical trade size of $10 million.  In fact, trade sizes of $50 million-$250 
million are not uncommon (authors’ personal communication with a currency trader). 
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One possible influence on the turnover trend is that retail investors are participating to a greater 
extent because of enhanced access to online trading (Barber and Odean, 2000), and lower trading 
costs arising from technological improvements and decreases in the tick size.  Though French 
(2008) shows that direct holdings of individuals have declined (from about 47% in 1980 to about 
22% in 2006), the enhanced ease of trading may have increased trading by individual investors, 
thus influencing the turnover trend.  An alternative possibility is that institutions are able to trade 
more frequently and more cheaply, and their increased activity is the predominant cause of the 
turnover patterns.   
 
To provide some evidence on the preceding possibilities, stocks are sorted into five 
groups by institutional holdings, measured by the percentage of shares held by institutions in the 
immediately preceding quarter.  The average turnover for these groups is plotted in Figure 5.  
Group 5 has the highest institutional holdings and Group 1 the lowest.  As shown in the figure, 
turnover has increased the most in absolute terms for stocks that are held most by institutions, 
and there is a monotonic relation in the turnover trends across the groups.  This pattern is 
confirmed in Panel A of Table 5, which provides the mean values of turnover in the two 
subperiods across the five institutional holdings groups.  The average turnover increases by 
twelve percentage points for the highest holdings quintile in the second subperiod, but only by 
three percentage points for the lowest holdings quintile.22   
 
Table 5 also presents turnover due to large and small trades separately for the two 
subperiods across the institutional holdings quintiles.  It can be seen that for the group with the 
largest institutional holdings, small trade turnover has increased by about 0.2% to 6.3% across 
                                                     
22 A question that arises here is whether the increase in turnover is due to general increases in the level of 
institutional holdings (for example, due to growth in the mutual fund industry driven in part by increased 
participation in 401(k) plans—Cf. Saxton, 2002 or Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2001) or is due to increases in trading 
activity orthogonal to changes in institutional holdings.  To distinguish between these possibilities, stocks are sorted 
into quintiles by the average change in institutional holdings across the two subperiods, and then by average level of 
holdings across the full sample period.   The average change in turnover across the two subperiods is then calculated 
for each of the 25 portfolios.  Within each holdings change quintile, the change in turnover increases monotonically 
and significantly across the five holdings groups.  This indicates that even after controlling for changes in 
institutional holdings, stocks with greater levels of institutional holdings have experienced greater increases in 
turnover. 
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the two sub-periods, whereas the corresponding increase is only from 0.4% to 1.9% for the 
lowest holdings group.   The corresponding numbers for large trade turnover are 8.3% to 14.6% 
and 3.7% to 5.6%, respectively.      
 
In Panel B of Table 5, we provide trend fits to the time-series of the difference in turnover 
between highest and lowest institutional ownership groups.  We perform the trend fits for the 
differences in overall, small trade, and large trade turnover.   For the overall turnover differential, 
three of the four trend variables are positive and significant, and the regression explains 57% of 
the variation in the difference.   The trend variables are all positive and significant for the small 
trade turnover differential, and the adjusted R2 of the regression is 81%.  However, for the large 
trade turnover differential across the extreme holdings quintiles, the trend regression explains 
only 27% of the variation in the dependent variable and the significance of the trend variables is 
considerably weaker.  Thus, the evidence suggests that during recent years, turnover in stocks 
with high institutional holdings has positively and significantly diverged from that in stocks with 
low levels of institutional holdings, and this divergence is driven by the increase in small trade 
turnover.   
 
Another perspective on the trade size patterns across institutional holdings groups is 
provided by the average ratios of turnover across the extreme holdings quintiles.  Specifically, 
we use the raw data for Table 5 to calculate the daily ratio of turnover in the quintile with the 
largest institutional holdings to that in the quintile with the smallest level of holdings, separately 
for small and large trades.  We then average these ratios for the two subperiods.  For small 
trades, the average ratios of turnover in the largest quintile relative to the smallest are 
respectively 0.497 and 3.34 for the first and second subperiods.  Thus, small trade turnover in the 
largest holdings quintile relative to that in the smallest one is about half in the first subperiod but 
increases to more than 300% in the second subperiod.  The corresponding ratios for large trade 
turnover across the extreme holdings quintiles are 2.24 and 2.62, so that the change in the large 
trade turnover ratio across the subperiods is much smaller relative to that for small trades.   A 
trend analysis (not reported for brevity) confirms a significant and positive trend for the small 
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trade ratio but an insignificant trend for the large trade ratio.  This confirms that the proclivity of 
institutions to execute small trades has increased in recent years.  
 
It is possible that institutional holdings are a proxy for firm size, thus contaminating 
inferences.  To address this, we independently sort firms into institutional holdings and market 
capitalization-based quintiles and document total turnover, and turnover for large and small 
trades.  The general pattern is preserved even within size quintiles (unreported.)  Specifically, 
turnover generally is higher for the firms with greater institutional holdings, regardless of the 
size quintile.  The difference in total turnover across quintiles with the largest and smallest 
holdings is statistically greater (at the 1% level) in the second sub-period within every size 
quintile.  It is also easily verified that in 14 out 15 cases (five each for total, small, and large 
trade turnover), the ratio of average turnover in the second sub-period to that in the first is greater 
for the quintile representing the largest level of institutional holdings relative to the quintile with 
the lowest holdings.   
 
Overall, the findings support the notion that the increase in turnover is driven more by 
institutions rather than by retail investors.  However, direct data on institutional and retail trading 
are not available over the extended sample period of this study.  Therefore, we now present 
additional evidence to support the link between turnover increases and increased institutional 
trading. 
 
First, in order to distinguish retail from institutional trading, we examine the change in 
the number of shareholders over time.23  Such a change may be attributed to changes in the 
breadth of ownership, and may be linked to changes in the number of retail investors holding, 
and thus trading, stocks.  We obtain the number of shareholders from Compustat and calculate 
the value-weighted number of shareholders for NYSE firms each year.  This quantity actually 
                                                     
23 It would be desirable to have direct data on retail trading.  However, these data are not available for our sample 
period because the standard discount brokerage dataset used, for example, by Odean (1998) does not extend beyond 
the year 2000. 
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shows a modest decrease during the sample period; thus, the average annual numbers of 
shareholders are 190,230 and 181,141 in the 1993-2000 and 2001-2008 periods, respectively.   
 
Further light on the number of shareholders is shed by the following exercise.  For each 
stock listed in both the former and latter subperiods, we calculate the change in its average 
turnover across the periods and the change in the average annual number of registered 
shareholders (as listed in Compustat).24  The change in average turnover is then regressed on the 
change in the number of shareholders.  The coefficient in this regression is insignificant with a t-
value of 0.47, indicating that trends in the shareholder base have not had a significant impact on 
turnover. This suggests that increased trading by existing shareholders, rather than changes in 
breadth of ownership is the stronger determinant of turnover.  
 
Next, we consider serial correlation in trade imbalances as a way to distinguish trends in 
retail and institutional trading.  Previous research indicates that first order serial correlations in 
trade imbalances are strongly positive (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2002).  Lee et al. 
(2005) attribute these serial correlations to both reputational herding (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990) as well as order splitting (Kyle, 1985) by investors.  An overall increase in the serial 
correlation of imbalance in more recent years would be consistent with the increase in turnover 
and would signify either increased herding or increased frequency of split orders.   While a 
change in the serial correlation of small trades can be attributed to retail investors as well as 
institutional investors, an increase in the serial correlation of large trades is more likely to be 
driven by institutional trades.    
 
Table 6 presents the first order serial correlations for daily share trade imbalance, 
calculated as the daily buy volume minus sell volume, scaled by total volume.  We compute the 
serial correlations for the overall sample as well as for the five institutional holdings quintiles.  
The correlations are first calculated stock-by-stock, and then averaged across stocks.   We also 
                                                     
24 The Compustat variable is understated because many shares are held in street name by brokers on behalf of 
individuals (Knewtson and Sias, 2008).  Nonetheless, the variable should be strongly correlated with the breadth of 
ownership. 
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present the correlations separately for large and small trades.  The results in Table 6 reveal that 
the overall serial correlation increased in the second subperiod for the full sample as well as for 
every holdings quintile.  In addition, serial correlations for both small and large trades increased 
in the second subperiod; the point estimate of the increase is greatest for the largest holdings 
quintile.25  This again supports the notion that increased trading by institutions drives the overall 
trend in turnover.26    
 
Another way to distinguish the roles of retail versus institutional traders is to look at 
turnover patterns in low- and high-priced stocks.  Indeed, Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual 
funds are reluctant to hold low-priced stocks.  We therefore stratify all sample stocks into two 
groups: group 1 consists of those stocks whose monthly average closing price was less than $10 
throughout the sample period, and group 2 consists of the complementary set.   Across the two 
subperiods, average monthly turnover for the first group increased from 6.9% to 14.5%, whereas 
that for the second group increased from 7.4% to 16.5%.  It can be seen that the relative increase 
in turnover is larger for the second group of stocks, and we have verified that the increase in the 
turnover difference between the two groups is statistically significant.  This further bolsters the 
role of institutions in causing the turnover trend. 
 
We also consider the correlation between the change in institutional holdings and 
turnover.  We first calculate the absolute value of the change in institutional holdings for each 
stock and each quarter within our sample (institutional holdings from the Thomson database are 
only available for the quarterly horizon).   We then calculate the time-series average of the cross-
sectional correlation between turnover and the absolute change in holdings separately for the 
1993-2000 and 2001-2008 subperiods.  The average correlation is positive and increased from 
0.187 to 0.213 in the second subperiod, suggesting increased representation of institutional 
                                                     
25 Of all the changes in serial correlations in the second subperiod relative to the first, only the increases listed in the 
second columns of Panels A and C (i.e., those for the overall sample, representing the combined and large trade 
imbalances) are significant at the 10% level.  All other changes are insignificant. 
26 Earlier we argued that institutions have increasingly been reducing transaction sizes in recent years, possibly due 
to order splitting.  However, at least some agents would continue to use large orders, especially if they possess 
perishable private information.  Such agents are more likely to be institutions. 
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trading in the latter period’s turnover.  Note, however, that the quarterly change in institutional 
holdings is a noisy proxy for institutional trading because it misses trades that may occur within 
the quarter.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that increased trading by institutions in recent years, due 
to enhanced liquidity and decreased trading commissions, has materially influenced the increase 
in turnover.  The evidence in this subsection and that from Tables 2 and 3 also accords with the 
notion that institutions have increasingly resorted to splitting orders in response to decreased 
market depth at the prevailing quotes.  In addition to secular decreases in trading costs, other 
turnover determinants could also have played a role in the increased turnover.  We next explore 
the role of these other potential influences. 
 
C.  The Roles of Dispersion of Opinion, Expected Volatility, and Fund Flows 
 
Previous literature has pointed to three important determinants of trading activity, divergence in 
analysts’ forecasts, return volatility, and money flows into equity funds.27   Greater analyst 
forecast dispersion and higher uncertainty (return volatility) are likely to be positively related to 
agents’ differences of opinion, which, in turn, is related to volume (Harris and Raviv, 1993).  
Return volatility may also lead to more portfolio rebalancing and thus higher trading volumes.   
 
While the previous section suggests that institutions and not individuals may be the 
driving force behind turnover, individual investor behavior may have changed over time in a way 
that may have influenced institutional turnover.  Indeed, the participation of investors in defined 
contribution retirement plans has increased considerably (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2001).  This 
implies that changes in equity fund flows may have contributed to an increase in turnover.   
 
To examine the role of these determinants in the turnover trend, we consider the 
following empirical constructs: (a) the monthly forecast dispersion, defined as the standard 
                                                     
27 See Edelen and Warner (2001) and Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007) for discussions on the importance of 
these determinants in the cross-section of turnover.  
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deviation of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from two or more analysts, divided by the 
previous month’s price,28 (b) the value-weighted average dispersion for the aggregate market, 
where the weights are based on market capitalization at the end of the previous year; (c) the VIX, 
a measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index published by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange;29 (d)  aggregate monthly flows to equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2008 
obtained from AMG Data Services.   
 
The average values of the dispersion index, VIX, and equity fund flows across the two 
subperiods are presented in Panels A and B of Table 7.  Dispersion and VIX both increased in 
the second subperiod.  Unreported tests indicate that the change in dispersion is significant while 
that in VIX is not.  However, the proportional differences in means across the subperiods for 
these two potential determinants of turnover are small relative to the corresponding turnover 
statistics documented in Table 1.  Further, mean fund flows actually decreased in the later 
subperiod, and the change is significant.  The decrease in the mean level may be due to the 
aftermath of the stock price rise and fall in the tech sector and the recent financial crisis.30  
Overall, changes in either of the three turnover determinants are either not large enough or are of 
the wrong sign, thus indicating that they likely cannot justify the dramatic increase in turnover in 
recent years.   
 
Nonetheless, to further explore the role of these determinants in the turnover increase, we 
perform a regression analysis in which value-weighted monthly NYSE turnover is the dependent 
variable and the potential turnover determinants in Table 7 are the right-hand variables.  In 
addition to these variables, we also include trend variables.  We present regressions both 
                                                     
28 Obtained from the I/B/E/S database disseminated by the firm Thomson Financial.  
29 We use implied option volatility because the speculative activity that sparks turnover would likely respond to 
expected volatility, rather than realized volatility.  We are grateful to Bob Whaley for providing the VIX data.   
30  Even though the mean flow into equities decreased in the second subperiod, the volatility of fund flows increased.  
The magnitude of the increase across the two subperiods is a substantial 43%, and an F-test indicates that the change 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This is consistent with asset allocation frequency increasing in recent 
years.  Indeed, the technology to switch between asset classes has improved substantially in that it now just takes a 
few clicks of the mouse to switch into a new mix of assets (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2006).  Thus, individuals may 
be prone to changing asset mixes more frequently in recent years. 
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including and excluding the Table 7 variables to clarify the explanatory power of these variables 
vis-à-vis the trend variables. 
 
 The regression results appear in Table 7.  The second and third columns contain results 
for the trend variables alone while the last two columns report the outcomes of including the 
additional determinants.  The table clearly demonstrates the role of the trend variables.  About 
88% of the time-series variation in turnover can be explained by these variables alone, and these 
variables are all positive and significant, confirming the dramatic up-trend in trading activity. 
Among the potential determinants in Table 7 only VIX is significant (and positive, as 
conjectured).  However, the explanatory power of the regression increases by just 2% when these 
potential determinants are added to the regression.  Overall, therefore, it seems reasonable to 
surmise that secular improvements in trading technology and decreases in trading costs are the 
principal contributors to the dramatically increased turnover in recent years.31  
 
V. Trading Activity Trends and Price Formation 
 
The previous section pointed to evidence suggesting that institutional trading, as opposed to 
retail investing, is more responsible for the dramatic increase in turnover in recent year.  This 
section examines the potential association between such an increase in trading and price 
formation and the cross-section of turnover and returns. 
 
 
A.  Price Formation  
 
As the previous section indicates, institutions may be trading more frequently on their own 
account due to exogenous factors such as lower tick sizes, decreased commissions and 
                                                     
31 Is the implied elasticity of turnover to trading costs within our sample in line with estimates in previous literature?  
The following back-of-the-envelope calculation sheds light on this issue.  The value-weighted NYSE turnover in the 
first and second subperiods (1993-2000 and 2001-2008) is 6.50 % and 13.02%, respectively.  Further, the NYSE 
quoted spread declined from 16.03 cents to 3.59 cents across the two subperiods.  These numbers imply an elasticity 
estimate of –1.29, which is comparable to, but higher than, the estimate of –1.13 in Jones (2002), and the –0.25 to –
1.00 range cited in the studies discussed by Schwert and Seguin (1993).  Our calculation, of course, is merely 
illustrative and does not account for the fact that transactions frequently take place within and outside the spread. 
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improvements in trading technology.  Such phenomena may enable them to trade on private 
information more effectively because decreased trading frictions may increase returns from 
information-based trading.  However, if institutions only pass along individual investors’ asset 
allocation decisions to the financial markets, one would not expect much change in information-
based trading.  Variance ratios computed using open-to-close and close-to-open returns can shed 
light on these competing hypotheses.  
 
French and Roll (1986) relate these ratios to the amount of information incorporated into 
prices.  They show that the hourly open-to-close return variances are greater than the hourly 
close-to-open variances and offer three potential explanations for this finding: (i) incorporation 
of private information during trading hours, (ii) mispricing caused by investor misreaction or 
market frictions and microstructure noise induced by bid-ask bounce, and (iii) greater 
incorporation of public information into prices during trading hours.  They reject (iii) because the 
variance ratios are not significantly different on business days when the stock market is closed.  
They conclude that the other two components help explain the higher ratio during market trading 
hours, with (i) being the dominant factor.32   
 
Panel A of Table 8 documents the average values of the variance ratios across the 1993-
2000 and 2001-2008 periods.  The mean variance ratios in the former and latter periods are 9.92 
and 12.46, respectively.  Thus, variance ratios increased by about 26% in the second subperiod 
on average. This change is statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, increased turnover, 
possibly due to lower trading costs, has been accompanied by an increase in the variance ratio 
based on open-to-close and close-to-open returns.33 
 
                                                     
32 More recently, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) argue that these variance ratios reveal the degree of 
private information produced by the trading process.   
33 Our analysis of open/close to close/open variance ratios does not account for after-hours trading (e.g., Barclay and 
Hendershott, 2004) that has become prevalent in the second subperiod.  But, if such trading contributes to volatility, 
it would increase the close-open variance and thus tend to reduce the variance ratio we compute.    But, we find that 
the variance ratio increases in the later subperiod.  This indicates that our inference that the trading process creates 
more volatility in the second subperiod is unaffected by the consideration of after-hours trading. 
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We have argued that the increase in trading activity in recent years is driven primarily by 
institutions.  If this is the case, and variance ratios capture trading on private information (as 
suggested by French and Roll, 1986), then one would expect a greater shift in the variance ratios 
in stocks more widely held by institutions.  This should be revealed by variance ratio shifts for 
stocks divided into groups by institutional holdings.  Results appear in Panel B of Table 8.  It can 
be seen from the table that the increase in the variance ratios is most pronounced for stocks with 
the highest levels of institutional holdings.  Indeed, the percentage changes in the variance ratios 
in the second subperiod relative to the first are –7.9%, 13.5%, 30.9%, 58.3%, and 35.2% for the 
smallest to the largest holdings groups, respectively, and only the latter three increases are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, the increase in variance ratios is most evident in 
stocks with the higher levels of institutional holdings.  In Panel C, we present a trend fit for the 
difference in variance ratios between the highest and lowest holdings quintiles.  The difference 
exhibits a significantly positive linear trend (and an insignificant quadratic trend). 34  Thus, in 
recent years, the variance ratio for stocks with the highest institutional representation has 
diverged positively and significantly from that in stocks with the lowest levels of institutional 
holdings.  The overall evidence, coupled with the conclusions of French and Roll (1986), thus 
supports the dual notions that institutions are trading more actively and trading on private 
information more effectively in recent years.35 
 
While French and Roll (1986) show that much of the variance due to the trading process 
arises from private information, it is still possible that increased uninformed noise trading may 
be driving the increased variance ratios during trading hours relative to non-trading ones.  As 
French and Roll (1986) argue, such noise trading should be associated with inefficiencies such as 
                                                     
34 Only linear and quadratic terms are included in this trend fit as well as that in Tables 13 and 14 to follow, because 
higher order terms are statistically insignificant.  In any event, the less parsimonious specification which includes 
the cubic and quartic terms does not alter the qualitative conclusions; results are available upon request. 
35 The reader may wonder how the increased variance ratios in recent years, implying increased private information 
production are consistent with the increased liquidity documented, for example, in Jones (2002), Brennan, Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2008) or in our Table 3, given that adverse selection due to informed trading reduces 
liquidity (Kyle, 1985).  However, equilibrium liquidity may also be influenced by greater uninformed trades due to 
indexation or greater frequency of asset allocation by individual investors (as discussed in the previous section).  
Further, greater information production that is due to exogenous decreases in trading costs is likely associated with 
an increase in the number of informed traders, and this phenomenon may further increase equilibrium liquidity due 
to enhanced competition between the informed (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988).    
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serial dependence in stock returns.  To investigate this issue, we computed the value-weighted 
average daily first order return serial correlations for the entire sample of NYSE stocks and for 
the five holdings groups in both the first and second subperiods.  To mitigate the problem of bid-
ask bounce, these correlations are obtained from mid-quote returns, using the last quote of a 
trading day that can be matched to a transaction.   
 
The results (not reported) show that the absolute serial correlation falls from 2.22% to 
0.01% in the second subperiod relative to the first.  The average serial correlation is 3.68% for 
the largest holding quintile in the first subperiod, which, interestingly, is the highest absolute 
correlation amongst all of the holdings quintiles.  This correlation falls to 0.19% in the second 
subperiod, forming the biggest drop in absolute serial correlations across all of the holdings 
groups.  While the decrease in serial correlations is modest (their values in the first subperiod are 
low to begin with), the point estimates suggest that increased trading has been accompanied by 
an increase in market efficiency. 
 
We now investigate trends in the degree of intraday price fluctuations.  If indeed the extra 
activity is primarily uninformed, i.e., it emanates principally from “noise” traders, more volatile 
prices may result (Black, 1986).  To test whether this is indeed the case, we calculate intradaily 
volatility, measured as the standard deviation of five-minute returns for each stock. In order to 
mitigate bid-ask bounce concerns, we use prevailing quote midpoints at five-minute intervals, 
rather than transactions prices. 
 
An alternative approach to measuring market quality involves the comparison of short- 
and long-horizon variance ratios.  For a random walk price process, the variance of long-horizon 
returns is q times the variance of short horizon returns, where q is the number of short horizon 
intervals in the longer horizon.  Deviations from a random walk can arise because noise trading 
can cause return serial correlation (Grossman and Miller, 1988).  Our notion is that there should 
be smaller deviations from random walk benchmarks in recent years if the higher trading activity 
has improved market quality.  We consider the ratio of mid-quote return variances computed 
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from hourly intervals and from open-to-close of trading days as in Bessembinder (2003).  In 
computing this variance ratio, the hourly return variance is multiplied by the number of hourly 
intervals in a trading day.   
 
Panel A of Table 9 reports intraday volatility and hourly to daily variance ratios for the 
two subperiods.  The variables are computed monthly for each stock and then averaged across 
stocks for each month in the sample period.  It can be seen that the intraday volatility drops 
substantially in the second subperiod.  Furthermore, consistent with intuition, the variance ratios 
are closer to unity in the later period, indicating that prices in recent years conform more closely 
to random walks.  Panel B fits linear and quadratic trends to the two time-series, and confirms 
the decline in both series (the linear term is negative and strongly significant; while the quadratic 
term is positive, it is easily confirmed that the overall trend is downward).36  The evidence 
therefore indicates that the extent of “noise” induced by the trading process is smaller in later 
years.   
 
To see if the relations proposed above hold at the individual firm level, in Panel C of 
Table 9, we present we present results from a cross-sectional regression where the dependent 
variables, in turn, are the change in average intraday volatility and the hourly/daily variance ratio 
across the two subperiods, and the explanatory variables are changes in turnover and institutional 
holdings.   The right-hand variables are included separately in univariate regressions, and 
together in a multivariate regression.  Based on the regressions where the variables are included 
separately, the results indicate that for either measure, stocks with the greatest increase in 
turnover and institutional holdings have experienced the greatest decrease in volatility and 
hourly/daily variance ratios.  In the multivariate regressions for intraday volatility, the holdings 
variable subsumes the effect of turnover; however, both variables are significant for the 
hourly/daily variance ratio.37  Thus, our analysis in this subsection, taken in totality, supports the 
notion that the dramatically increased trading activity in recent years has been accompanied by 
                                                     
36A split by holdings quintiles does not lead to substantial additional insight and therefore is not presented for 
brevity. 
37 Similar results are obtained when the change in the absolute daily first order return autocorrelation is used as the 
dependent variable; these are available upon request. 
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an increase in the degree of market quality and efficiency, both in the aggregate as well as at the 
individual firm level. 
 
B. The Possible Impact of Hedge Funds: Changes in the Cross-Section of Expected 
Turnover and Expected Returns 
 
Another potential reason for increased institutional trading activity has to do with the 
proliferation of hedge funds,38 possibly stimulated by the exogenous decreases in trading costs 
described in the previous subsection.  Academic research may also have stimulated hedge fund 
growth.   Specifically, in the early 1990s academics (e.g., Fama and French, 1992, Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993) uncovered reliable predictors of returns in the cross-section that did not appear to 
be related to risk.39  Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002) suggest that these effects form the backbone of 
strategies used by many hedge funds.  Thus, a potential explanation for the increased turnover is 
that institutions as a group, but mainly hedge funds, have employed rapid trading strategies more 
vigorously, as a result of prior academic research as well as secular declines in trading costs.    
 
This hedge fund explanation would be bolstered if turnover has become more sensitive to 
typical quantitative strategy triggers.40  Motivated by this observation, we cross-sectionally 
regress turnover for all NYSE-listed stocks on two explanatory variables as well as other 
controls.  The first explanatory variable is the absolute value of the one-month lagged return, 
which approximates changes in book/market or short-term momentum.  The second variable, 
intended to capture changes in long-term momentum, is the absolute value of the compounded 
return from month t-2 to month t-6, where t is the month in which turnover is measured.   
                                                     
38 Federal Reserve estimates indicate that the total dollar value of assets under hedge fund management have 
increased from about $250 billion in mid-1998 to more than $1 trillion in recent years.  For example, see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/warsh20070711a.htm and associated references therein. 
39 See, however, Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) for a debate on whether the profitability 
of these strategies is driven by rational time variation in expected returns. 
40 Consistent with the notion that hedge funds can short sell at lower cost than the typical investor, short interest on 
the NYSE has grown rapidly during our sample period (see Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005 or websites such as 
seekingalpha.com). This observation, however, does not directly indicate that hedge funds have contributed to 
upswings in turnover. Our analysis in this subsection is suggestive of the role of hedge funds in the trading activity 
trend. 
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As pointed out by Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007), past returns are the key 
determinants of trading activity, indicating that this regression is likely to be reasonably well 
specified.  However, to be prudent, size, dispersion in analyst forecasts, and firm age are also 
included.  Size (measured by market capitalization as of the end of the previous month) is an 
obvious candidate for explaining share turnover.  Further, Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam 
(2007) argue that analyst forecast dispersion and firm age represent uncertainty about a firm’s 
future cash flows, which, in turn, contributes to speculative trading activity.41  As in the previous 
section, analyst forecast dispersion represents the standard deviation of earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts from two or more analysts, scaled by the stock price as of the end of the previous 
month.  This variable is averaged annually, and the previous year’s observation is used in the 
regression.  Age is defined as the number of days since the date of first listing on CRSP, 
calculated as of the end of the previous year.  The coefficients of these control variables are 
suppressed for brevity.42 
 
Panel A of Table 10 provides summary statistics for the cross-sectional regression 
coefficients of monthly turnover on the two absolute return variables across the two subperiods.  
The mean coefficients for both return variables are greater in the latter subperiod than in the 
former, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for both return variables.  
While the median coefficients are smaller than the means, a Wilcoxon rank sum test rejects the 
equality of the medians across the subperiods for both return coefficients, with p-values less than 
0.05.43  In Panel B, we fit the coefficients of the two absolute return variables to trends and find 
that the trend terms are strongly significant in either case.44   
                                                     
41 Note that while Table 7 does not show a considerable increase in aggregate dispersion, there is still a need to 
control for it in a cross-sectional regression to draw reliable inferences about the behavior of  the return coefficients 
over our sample period. 
42 The qualitative features of our results are unaltered if the control variables are excluded, though the magnitudes of 
the return coefficients are higher without these variables. 
43 Both the average t-statistics from the cross-sectional regressions as well as the Newey and West (1987, 1994) t-
statistics for the means are well in excess of five in both subperiods for the one-month and the two-to-six month 
absolute return variables.   
44 As a robustness check, we also perform panel regressions that use the random effects method of Fuller and 
Battese (1974).  The dependent variable is turnover, and the explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 10.  
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The question naturally arises as to whether increased sensitivity of turnover to a key 
quantitative strategy trigger, namely, past returns, represents arbitrage activity that has reduced 
the cross-sectional predictability of equity returns.  To address this, we regress monthly returns 
on the following predictive variables:45 
1) SIZE: measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm’s equity in month t-
2, where t is the current month 
2)  BM: the ratio of the book value of the firm’s equity to its market value of equity at time t-2, 
where book value is calculated as in Fama and French (1992),  
3) TURN: the logarithm of the firm’s share turnover, measured as the trading volume divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding in month t-2,  
4) RET6: the cumulative return on the stock over the six months ending at the beginning of the 
previous month.  
The size, book/market, and momentum (RET6) variables are well-known cross-sectional return 
predictors.  Turnover is also an important predictor and has been variously interpreted as 
capturing a liquidity premium (Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998) or investor optimism (Baker 
and Stein, 2004).46  Our goal is to ascertain how the cross-sectional predictive power of these 
variables for equity returns has changed across the two subperiods. 
 
We adjust returns for risk using the Fama and French (1993) factors following the 
method of Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998).  The risk-adjusted returns are then 
cross-sectionally regressed on the equity characteristics described above.  The Fama-MacBeth 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Also, the return variables are interacted with an indicator variable that is unity in the 2001 to 2008 period, and zero 
otherwise.  The sample is an unbalanced panel of all NYSE-listed firms that had data available on all of the 
explanatory variables each month.  In this regression, turnover is strongly and positively related to the past return 
variables.  Further, in accordance with the Table 9 coefficients, the interacted variables are both positive and 
significant.  We also consider signed returns instead of absolute returns as the independent variables, in order to 
check if the increased sensitivity of turnover to past returns is asymmetric for negative and positive returns.  The 
results indicate that more negative or more positive returns both imply increased turnover, and the variables 
interacted with the post 2000 dummy are all statistically significant, clearly implying a stronger relation between 
turnover and the return variables in recent years.   
45 The subscript t-2 on the characteristics indicates that we lag them by at two months in order to avoid biases 
because of bid-ask effects and thin trading. 
46 Fama and French (1992, 1995) argue that size, book/market, and momentum are the critical cross-sectional 
predictors of stock returns.  Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) demonstrate the statistical significance of 
turnover over and beyond these variables.  We choose our four predictors based on these studies. 
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(1973) coefficients and the associated t-statistics for the two subperiods are presented in Table 
11.   Size and BM are not significant in either subperiod, consistent with the notion that the 
Fama-French factors capture these characteristics during our sample period.   While turnover and 
momentum are significant in the first subperiod, their significance drops off completely in the 
second subperiod.  The coefficient magnitudes for these variables also reduce by a factor of more 
than half.   Coupled with other evidence that cross-sectional return anomalies have weakened in 
recent years (Henker, Martens, and Hunh, 2006; Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2009) and 
are now mainly confined to stocks where institutions are not well-represented (Nagel, 2005, 
Phalippou, 2008), the stronger connection between turnover and past returns seems consistent 
with institutional activity bringing about more efficient price formation. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a technological factor leading to an increase in 
institutional turnover is likely the increasing prevalence of algorithmic trading by hedge funds 
and other institutions.  Dramatic improvements in technology have allowed computer algorithms 
to speedily discern (possibly short-lived) profit opportunities and determine optimal order 
submission strategies, typically by dividing up a large order into smaller trades to reduce market 
impact. Such short-term algorithmic trading is often termed “high frequency trading” (HFT). 47  
Algorithms also dynamically monitor liquidity across different trading venues and choose 
optimal price and quantity pairs along with order submission strategies (limit versus market 
orders) to efficiently execute orders.48       
 
HFT algorithms are by nature proprietary, which precludes the precise identification of 
algorithmic trading in aggregate data.  Nonetheless, our results on turnover patterns, including 
the decline in trade size, the increase in number of trades, the increased trading in stocks with 
higher institutional holdings, and the heightened sensitivity of turnover to past returns, are all 
consistent with HFT algorithms that have allowed institutions to trade more cheaply and more 
frequently.  Indeed, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) show that algorithmic trades by 
                                                     
47See, for example, Brogaard (2010) or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmic_trading.  
48 Algorithmic trading was non-existent in the early 1990s but is expected to represent about half of the trading 
volume by 2010.  See “Ahead of the tape –Algorithmic Trading,” Economist, March 10, 2007. 
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institutions play an important role in liquidity provision by de facto market making, thus 
contributing to the positive feedback between liquidity and trading activity.  Our evidence 
indicates that this enhanced institutional activity is associated with increased efficiency of price 
formation.49 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
Share turnover has increased dramatically over the past several years.  We explore the anatomy 
of this significant uptrend in aggregate trading activity and accompanying shifts in measures of 
market efficiency.  The increase in trading is associated with more frequent smaller trades, which 
have progressively formed a larger fraction of trading volume over time.  It appears that 
institutions, rather than retail investors, have played the dominant role in the volume trend, 
because share turnover has increased the most for stocks with the greatest level of institutional 
holdings.  Institutions appear to breaking up orders into ever-smaller increments before trading. 
 
The cross-sectional behavior of turnover around the exogenous decline in tick sizes 
suggest that a decline in trading costs plays a role in the dramatic increase in trading. 
Determinants of trading activity such as aggregate dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and implied 
volatility show no dramatic shifts in a manner consistent with the increase in turnover.  Variance 
ratio tests indicate that the increase in turnover is associated with greater information-based 
trading, particularly in stocks with greater levels of institutional holdings.  Furthermore, intraday 
volatility has decreased and prices conform more closely to random walk in recent years, 
indicating that market efficiency has increased in response to the increased institutional trading.  
The cross-section of turnover has also changed, in that turnover has become more sensitive to 
past returns in recent years.  Thus, at least part of the recent rise in turnover may be attributed to 
institutions such as hedge funds, which employ quantitative trading strategies.  Evidence 
                                                     
49 During the week of August 24-28, 2009, the three firms with the highest trading volumes on Nasdaq were all high 
frequency traders and they accounted for an average of 26.6% of the overall daily trading volume.  The top twenty 
trading firms accounted for 62.7% of the Nasdaq daily trading volume and of this the high frequency traders 
accounted for 33.3% of the total daily trading volume (personal communication with Frank Hatheway, Chief 
Economist, Nasdaq).    It is possible that similar trading patterns prevail on the NYSE as well. 
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indicates that such trading has been accompanied by decreased cross-sectional return 
predictability, providing further support to the general notion that the increased trading activity 
has increased the efficiency of price formation. 
 
Our analysis sheds light on the policy debate surrounding securities transaction taxes 
(STTs) and market volatility.  Specifically, lawmakers in both the US and the Europe have 
recently proposed taxing equity trading.50  An oft-cited rationale for STTs (e.g., Summers and 
Summers, 1989; Stiglitz, 1989) is that they will curb high trading activity and, in turn, control 
price volatility.  Our analysis indicates that the dramatically increased trading activity has been 
accompanied by an increase in market efficiency and decreased intraday volatility.   Not only is 
our work at odds with the notion that high trading has increased intradaily price fluctuations, it 
also suggests any tax that reduces trading activity may in fact have an adverse impact on the 
quality of financial markets.  Thus, our paper indicates that STTs should be pursued with an 
abundance of caution. 
 
Our research raises a few questions, which are worthy of further analysis.  First, the 
impact of the dramatic increase in trading activity on investor welfare is an open question.  For 
example, which groups of traders have benefited the most from increased trading activity?  Is it 
institutions trading for their accounts or retail investors that invest through institutions?  While 
markets have generally become more liquid, are there more episodes of high and low liquidity in 
aggregate as institutions respond to similar algorithmic triggers?  Has the speed of price 
discovery around informational events increased in conjunction with the increase in trading?  
These and other issues are left for future research. 
                                                     
50 See, for example, “Transaction Tax Still Has Traction, Lawmaker Says,” (November 9, 2009) at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/11/09/transaction-tax-still-has-traction-lawmaker-says/, or “EU to Push Levies 
on Banks, Financial-Transaction Tax at G-20” (June 17, 2010) at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/eu-
leaders-to-push-global-taxes-on-banks-financial-transactions-at-g-20.html 
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Table 1 
Turnover summary statistics and trend fits, 1993-2008 
 
Panel A presents the monthly value-weighted average turnover for New York Stock Exchange 
stocks in two subperiods, 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  Stocks in the S&P 500 index and all other 
NYSE stocks are reported separately.  Each month, a value-weighted average turnover is 
computed using the market capitalization at the end of the previous year.  Time series means, 
medians and standard deviations are reported for the monthly value-weighted averages.  The 
turnover data are obtained from CRSP.  Panel B presents trend fits for the turnover series to 
orthogonal Legendre polynomials for the overall period 1993 to 2008.   
 
 
A: Summary Statistics (in % per month) 
 
 
S&P500 
turnover 
Non-S&P500 
turnover 
A: 1993-2000 
Mean 6.3 7.2 
Median 6.2 6.8 
Std. Dev. 1.3 1.5 
B: 2001-2008 
Mean 12.4 16.2 
Median 9.8 14.1 
Std. Dev. 6.2 6.5 
 
B: Trend Fits 
 
 S&P 500 turnover Non-S&P 500 turnover 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Linear 0.0682 23.21 0.0941 26.37 
Quadratic 0.0457 11.96 0.0474 10.23 
Cubic 0.0466 10.27 0.0329 5.98 
Quartic 0.0464 8.97 0.0325 5.17 
Adjusted R2 0.8191 0.8185 
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Table 2  
The evolution of dollar trade size, number of transactions, and trade size  
 
Panels A and B report, respectively, the average daily dollar trade size and average daily number 
of transactions on the NYSE in two subperiods, 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  The number of 
transactions and the average dollar trade size are calculated for each stock on each day and then 
value-weighted using the market capitalization at the end of the previous year.  Panels C and D 
report the proportions of dollar trading volume represented by large and small trades, 
respectively, on the NYSE in the same subperiods.  Large trades exceed $10,000 and small 
trades are all others.  Each trade on each day for each stock is classified as either large or small.  
Then the proportions of large and small trades are calculated for each stock each day and value-
weighted across stocks using the market capitalization at the end of the previous year.  Time 
series means, medians and standard deviations are reported for the daily value-weighted 
averages.  Panel E reports non-linear time trends fit over 1993 to 2008 for the value-weighted 
average daily dollar trade size, daily number of transactions, and the percentage of trades less 
than $10,000 on the NYSE.  Trend fits are to orthogonal Legendre polynomials.  The dollar 
value of each trade comes from the TAQ dataset.   
 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 1993-2000 2001-2008 
 
A: Trade Size 
($thousands) 
B: Number of 
Transactions 
Mean 82.9 36.4 1136.54 14779.35 
Median 83.8 36.3 735.50 4250 
Std. Dev. 9.7 20.7 882.17 22715.97 
 C: Trades ≤ $10,000 (%) D: Trades > $10,000 (%) 
Mean 4.46 18.18 95.54 81.82 
Median 4.21 11.30 95.79 88.70 
Std. Dev. 0.97 14.69 0.97 14.69 
 
E: Time Trends 
 
Number of 
transactions Trade Size 
Percentage of 
trades ≤ 
$10,000  
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Linear 0.1715 27.57 -0.0409 -86.16 0.1542 64.50 
Quadratic 0.1940 24.17 -0.0272 -44.33 0.1641 53.16 
Cubic 0.1861 19.58 0.0155 21.39 0.0947 25.93 
Quartic 0.1558 14.46 0.0053 6.42 0.0630 15.20 
Adjusted R2 0.3292 0.7108 0.6683 
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Table 3   
Effective Spreads for Small (≤$10,000) and Large (>$10,000) Trades, and Depth 
 
This table presents the time series means, medians and standard deviations of (i) the daily value-
weighted average effective spreads for small (Panel A) and large (Panel B) trades and (ii) the 
value-weighted depth (Panel C) on the NYSE  in the two subperiods 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  
The effective spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price 
and the mid-point of the bid-ask spread.  Depth is the average of the numbers of shares available 
for trade at the inside ask and bid.  Average effective spreads and depths are calculated for each 
stock on each day then value-weighted across stocks.  The data for effective spreads and depths 
is obtained from TAQ. 
 
 
 
 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 
A: Effective Spread, Trade ≤ $10,000 
Mean 0.1022 0.0223 
Median 0.1164 0.0184 
Std. Dev. 0.0211 0.0092 
B: Effective Spread, Trade > $10,000 
Mean 0.1069 0.0267 
Median 0.1165 0.0220 
Std. Dev. 0.0172 0.0106 
C: Depth (shares) 
Mean 10353 2836 
Median 11130 2797 
Std. Dev. 3498 960.3 
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Table 4   
Cross-sectional Regressions around Tick Size Changes 
 
This table presents the coefficient estimates when the change in turnover is regressed on changes 
in the proportional quoted spread and in return volatility around the tick size events. The NYSE 
changed the tick size from $0.125 to $0.0625 (sixteenth shift) on June 24, 1997 and from 
$0.0625 to $0.01 (decimal shift) on January 29, 2001.  The average daily turnover and the 
average daily proportional spread is computed for each stock over the one month period before 
and after the tick size changes. The monthly volatility is the standard deviation computed using 
daily returns. The dependent variable is the average change in turnover across the two months 
before and after the tick size change; and the explanatory variables are the average change in the 
proportional quoted spread (∆RQSPR) and the change in the volatility of returns.  Daily returns 
are obtained from CRSP while the turnover and spreads are obtained from the TAQ dataset. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Sixteenth Shift 
∆RQSPR -0.06524 -5.96 
∆Volatility 0.09254 19.88 
Decimal Shift 
∆RQSPR -0.04164 -4.80 
∆ Volatility 0.06004 15.79 
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Table 5  
Turnover by Institutional Holding Quintiles  
 
Stocks are divided into five groups by the level of institutional holdings (defined as the 
percentage of the total common stock held by institutions) in the immediately preceding quarter.  
Then, the total turnover, small trade turnover (estimated using trades that are less than or equal to 
$10,000) and large trade turnover (estimated using trades that are greater than $10,000) are 
computed for each stock each month.  The value weighted average turnovers are then computed 
each month for each institutional holding quintile.  In Panel A, these value-weighted averages are 
then averaged by institutional holding quintiles over the two sub-periods.   Panel B fits the 
turnover difference between the largest and smallest holdings quintiles to trend variables. Trend 
fits are to orthogonal Legendre polynomials. 
 
A: Summary Statistics (% per month) 
 
 Institutional Holdings Group 
 Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
A: Total Turnover 
1993-2000 4.137 4.671 5.500 7.087 8.513 
2001-2008 7.432 9.623 12.306 16.029 20.828 
B: Small Trade Turnover, Trades ≤ $10,000 
1993-2000 0.435 0.217 0.187 0.205 0.216 
2001-2008 1.875 2.342 3.111 4.433 6.263 
C: Large Trade Turnover, Trades > $10,000 
1993-2000 3.702 4.454 5.314 6.883 8.297 
2001-2008 5.557 7.281 9.194 11.596 14.566 
 
 
B: Trend Fits for Difference in Turnover  
between Largest and Smallest Institutional Holdings Group 
 
 
 
Total Turnover 
Difference 
Small Trade 
Turnover 
Difference 
Large Trade 
Turnover 
Difference 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Linear 0.0881 13.86 0.0532 19.11 0.0351 7.83 
Quadratic 0.0528 6.52 0.0567 15.91 -0.0034 -0.60 
Cubic 0.0226 2.40 0.0425 10.22 -0.0194 -2.93 
Quartic 0.0107 1.02 0.0232 4.99 -0.0117 -1.59 
Adjusted R2 0.5716 0.8077 0.2735 
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Table 6  
First order daily serial correlations in trade imbalances by institutional holdings 
 
All stocks are divided into five groups by the level of institutional holdings (defined as the 
percentage of the total common stock held by institutions) in the immediately preceding quarter.  
For each stock each day, total imbalance is buy volume minus the sell volume, scaled by total 
volume; Small trade imbalance is the same but uses only trades less than or equal to $10,000.  
Analogously, large trade imbalance uses only trades greater than $10,000. The first order serial 
correlation of these imbalances is calculated for each stock during two subperiods.  Finally, the 
value-weighted averages of the daily serial correlations are computed across institutional holding 
quintiles.   The trading data are obtained from the TAQ dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 All 
Stocks 
Institutional Holdings Group 
 Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
A: Total Trade Imbalance 
1993-2000 0.102 0.103 0.101 0.103 0.101 0.099 
2001-2008 0.198 0.171 0.191 0.200 0.212 0.227 
B: Trade Imbalance in Small Trades (≤ $10,000) 
1993-2000 0.183 0.132 0.168 0.213 0.222 0.176 
2001-2008 0.223 0.189 0.221 0.224 0.239 0.252 
C: Trade Imbalance in Large Trades (> $10,000) 
1993-2000 0.089 0.076 0.084 0.092 0.096 0.097 
2001-2008 0.160 0.117 0.155 0.167 0.180 0.192 
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Table 7   
Regressions for Aggregate Turnover, 1993-2008 
 
The upper panels present summary statistics for potential determinants of NYSE turnover across 
the two subperiods 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  The proposed determinants are (i) the value-
weighted analyst forecast dispersion, (ii) the implied volatility of S&P 500 index, measured by 
VIX, and (iii) the monthly aggregated money flows into equity funds.   The forecast dispersion is 
defined as the monthly standard deviation of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from two or 
more analysts, divided by the previous month’s price and scaled up by 100.  This is value-
weighted using the market capitalization as of the end of the previous year.  The lower panels 
report regressions whose dependent variable is the monthly value-weighted NYSE turnover from 1993 to 
2008.  The explanatory variables consist of linear through quartic trend fits to orthogonal Legendre 
polynomials and, in the second regression, the potential determinants whose summary statistics are given 
in the upper panels.  The coefficient for equity fund flows is scaled upwards by 106.   
  
 1993-2000 2001-2008 
Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion 
Mean 0.246 0.275 
Median 0.246 0.267 
Std. Dev. 0.055 0.073 
Implied Volatility (VIX) 
Mean 20.52 23.00 
Median 19.43 22.18 
Std. Dev. 6.92 11.24 
Equity Fund Flows ($millions/month)
Mean 11655 3984 
Median 12447 6448 
Std. Dev. 11673 16701 
 
 With trend variables only With trend variables and other potential determinants 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Linear 0.0650 31.06 0.0600 26.11 
Quadratic 0.0398 14.79 0.0455 13.41 
Cubic 0.0386 12.22 0.0263 7.25 
Quartic 0.0328 9.20 0.0125 2.65 
Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion   0.0615 0.29 
Equity Fund Flows   -0.1281 -1.29 
VIX   0.0012 4.76 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8830 0.9027 
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Table 8 
Variance Ratios Computed using Open-to-Close and Close-to-Open Returns 
 
The panels below present basic summary statistics for per hour open/close to close/open variance 
ratios for NYSE stocks during the sub-periods 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  The ratios are 
computed monthly from value-weighted open-to-close and close-to-open returns.  Then means, 
medians and standard deviation are computed across months within each subperiod.  Panel A 
includes all firms.  Panel B presents five groups sorted by the level of institutional holdings 
(defined as the percentage of the total common stock held by institutions) in the immediately 
preceding quarter.  Panel C provides coefficient estimates from a regression that fits a non-linear 
time trend to the difference in the open-to-close to close-to-open variance ratio between high and 
low institutional holdings quintile portfolios.  
 
 
 
A:  All Firms 
 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 
Mean 9.917 12.46 
Median 8.301 10.99 
Std. Dev. 6.432 7.563 
 
 
B:  By Institutional Holding Quintiles 
 
 Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
Sub-
period 
1993-
2000 
2001-
2008 
1993-
2000 
2001-
2008 
1993-
2000 
2001-
2008 
1993-
2000 
2001-
2008 
1993-
2000 
2001-
2008 
Mean 13.10 12.07 9.923 11.26 9.088 11.90 9.061 14.35 11.60 15.68 
Median 11.54 10.29 8.742 9.816 7.813 10.36 7.481 11.92 9.211 13.22 
Std. Dev. 9.345 8.736 6.765 7.179 6.441 7.463 7.133 9.682 8.726 10.84 
 
C: Trend Fit for Difference in the Open-to-Close to Close-to-Open Variance Ratio  
Between the Largest and Smallest Institutional Holdings Groups 
 
 
 Open/Close to Close/Open 
Variance Ratio Difference 
(Largest-Smallest) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Linear 4.901 3.79 
Quadratic -2.270 -1.37 
Adjusted R2 0.0795 
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Table 9  
Intraday Volatility and Hourly/Daily Variance Ratios, 1993-2008 
 
The panels below present basic summary statistics for intraday volatility computed at five minute 
intervals (grossed up to daily volatility) and hourly/daily variance ratios for NYSE stocks during 
the sub-periods 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  The ratios are computed monthly and then means, 
medians and standard deviation are computed across months within each subperiod in Panel A.  
Panel B presents trend fits of the time series to orthogonal Legendre polynomials.  In Panel C, 
we present results from a cross-sectional regression where the dependent variables, in turn, are 
the change in the intraday volatility and the hourly/daily variance ratio, and the explanatory 
variables are changes in turnover and institutional holdings across the two sub-periods. 
 
A:  Summary Statistics 
 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 
Intraday Volatility 
Mean 0.0419 0.0252 
Median 0.0429 0.0205 
Std. Dev. 0.0063 0.0114 
Hourly/DailyVariance Ratios 
Mean 1.302 1.180 
Median 1.300 1.179 
Std. Dev. 0.0995 0.0914 
 
B: Trend Fit 
 
 Intraday Volatility 
Hourly/Daily 
Variance Ratios 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Linear -0.0141 -12.32 -0.1207 -6.86 
Quadratic 0.0037 2.49 0.0772 3.38 
Adjusted R2 0.4496 0.2274 
 
C: Cross-Sectional Regressions  
 
 
 Intraday Volatility Hourly/Daily Variance Ratios 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Turnover -0.051 -4.61   0.003 0.26 -0.456 -5.47   -0.235 -2.71 
Inst. Hldgs.   -0.089 -15.67 -0.089 -14.87   -0.406 -9.10 -0.364 -7.70 
Adjusted R2 0.0135 0.1423 0.1417 0.0192 0.0526 0.0566 
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Table 10  
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Turnover on Past Absolute Returns and Controls 
 
This table presents coefficients of the past month’s absolute return (LARET) and the absolute 
value of the compounded return over the past two to six months (LARET26) in the cross-
sectional regression of monthly turnover of NYSE stocks on these variables.  The sample period 
is 1993 to 2008.  Size, dispersion in analyst forecasts, and firm age are also included as controls.  
Size is measured by market capitalization as of the end of the previous month.  Analyst forecast 
dispersion represents the standard deviation of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from two or 
more analysts, scaled by the stock price as of the end of the previous month.  This variable is 
averaged annually, and the previous year’s observation is used in the regression.  Age is defined 
as the number of days since the date of first listing on CRSP, calculated as of the end of the 
previous year.  The coefficients of these control variables are suppressed for brevity.   In Panel 
A, summary statistics for the monthly return coefficients are computed separately across the 
subperiods 1993-2000 and 2001-2008.  Panel B fits the coefficients to trend variables. Trend fits 
are to orthogonal Legendre polynomials. 
 
 
A: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Past One-Month Return 
Coefficient (LARET) 
Past Two-to Six-Month Return 
Coefficient (LARET26) 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 1993-2000 2001-2008 
Mean 2.032 4.477 0.899 1.766 
Median 1.868 3.960 0.894 1.604 
Std. Dev. 0.942 2.668 0.347 1.154 
 
 
B: Trend Fits 
 
 Past One-Month Return 
Coefficient (LARET) 
Past Two-to Six-Month Return 
Coefficient (LARET26) 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Linear 2.426 8.87 0.9830 7.64 
Quadratic 1.973 5.64 0.9593 5.86 
Adjusted R2 0.3703 0.3304 
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Table 11 
Fama-MacBeth Regression Coefficients 
This table presents the time-series averages of individual stock cross-sectional OLS regression 
coefficient estimates and the associated t-statistics.  Following the methods of Brennan, Chordia 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) the dependent variable is the excess return risk-adjusted using the 
Fama-French (1993) factors. SIZE represents the logarithm of market capitalization in billions of 
dollars. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio with the exception that book-to-market 
ratios greater than the 0.995 fractile or less than the 0.005 fractile are set equal to the 0.995 and 
the 0.005 fractile values, respectively. TURN represents the logarithm of turnover. These 
variables are lagged by two months.  RET6 is the cumulative return over the second through the 
sixth month prior to the current month.  
 
 
 
 1993-2000 2001-2008 
 mean t-stat. mean t-stat. 
RET6 1.0668 3.27 0.4513 1.15 
SIZE 0.0465 0.87 -0.0356 -0.59 
BM 0.0062 0.07 0.0671 0.73 
TURN -0.2168 -2.44 -0.0365 -0.36 
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Figure 1. Average Turnover, S&P 500 Stocks and Other Stocks, 1993-2008.  This figure plots the 
monthly value-weighted average turnover for New York Stock Exchange stocks from 1993 to 2009. 
Stocks in the S&P 500 index and others are shown separately.  Each month, the value-weighted average 
turnover is computed using the market capitalization at the end of the previous year.  The turnover data 
are obtained from CRSP. 
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Figure 2.  Average Dollar Trade Size and Average Daily Number of Transactions, 1993-2008.  This 
figure shows the value-weighted average daily dollar trade size (Panel A) and value-weighted average 
daily number of transactions (Panel B) on the NYSE, 1993 to 2008.  The number of transactions and the 
average dollar trade size are calculated for each stock on each day and then value weighted across stocks 
using market capitalization at the end of the previous year.  Data for the number of transactions and dollar 
trade size are obtained each day from the TAQ dataset. 
 
Panel A: Average Dollar Trade Size, 1993-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 continued on next page
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Figure 2, continued 
 
Panel B:  Average Daily Number of Transactions, 1993-2008 
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Figure 3.  Percentage of Total Dollar Volume Due to Large and Small trades, 1993-2008.  This 
figure presents the percent of dollar trading volume represented by large and small trades on the NYSE.  
Large trades are defined as exceeding $10,000 and small trades are all others.  Each trade on each day for 
each stock is classified as either large or small.  Then the proportion of large and small trades is calculated 
for each stock each day.  The value-weighted average proportion of large and small trades is calculated 
each day.  The dollar value of each trade comes from the TAQ dataset. 
 
 
Panel A: Percentage of Trades Less or Equal to $10,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 continued on next page 
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Figure 3, continued 
 
 
 
Panel B: Percentage of Trades Greater Than $10,000 
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Figure 4.  Effective Spreads for Small and Large Orders and Market Depth, 1993-2008.   This figure 
presents the daily value-weighted average effective spreads for small and large trades (Panel A) and 
value-weighted mean depth (Panel B) on the NYSE in the period 1993 to 2008.  Large trades exceed 
$10,000 and small trades are all others.  Each trade on each day for each stock is classified as either large 
or small.    The effective spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price 
and the mid-point of the bid-ask spread.  Depth is the average of the number of shares available for trade 
at the inside ask and bid, and is averaged for each stock on each day.  The value-weighted average over 
stocks is obtained for both effective spreads and depth for each day over the time period.  The data for 
effective spreads and depths are obtained from TAQ. 
 
Panel A:  Effective Spreads for Small (≤$10,000) and Large (>$10,000) Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 continued on next page 
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Figure 4, continued 
 
 
Panel B: Market Depth, 1993-2008 
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Figure 5. Value-Weighted Average Turnover across Institutional Holdings Quintiles, 1993-2008, .  
All stocks are divided into five groups by the level of institutional holdings (defined as the percentage of 
the total common stock held by institutions) in the immediately preceding quarter.  Then, the total share 
turnover is computed for each stock each month.  The value weighted average turnovers (using market 
capitalizations as of the end of the previous year) are then computed each month for each institutional 
holding quintile.  The trading data are obtained from the TAQ dataset.  
 
 
 
 
